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1.	 Principles for efficient and equitable mitigation of the
negative effects of a water project.
a. Mitigation means steps for the reduction of negative
project impacts and compensation for those experiencing
negative residual effects.
b. Mitigation of what?
i) negative environmental effects;
ii) negative economic effects;
iii) negative social effects;
c. Absolutist approach:	 no residual negative effects
whatsoever! Usually impossible or very costly.
d.	 Economic approach (transparency):
i) carry out mitigation to a level at which the
marginal benefits (losses avoided) just equal the
marginal costs of mitigation;
ii) optimal mitigation costs are a legitimate project
cost that should be imposed on the project;
iii) residual costs should be compensated by the
project and are a legitimate project cost.
e. Relationship to Colorado statutes and practices.
	
2.	 Illustrations of values lost in reducing streamf lows and
water quality:
a. Non-recreational instream values for the sub-basins of
the Upper Colorado (source: Howe and Ahrens);
b. Recreational values related to seasonal streamflows:
case of the Poudre River (source: Daubert, Young, and
Gray, June 1979);
c. Values of higher water quality in the South Platte
River (eource: Greenley, Walsh, and Young 1980).
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ABSTRACT
A procedure for measuring option value and other preservation values
of water quality is developed and applied to a case study area in the
South Platte River Basin, Colorado. Benefits from water-based recreation
activities are the focus of the study. The results provide an empirical
test and confirmation of Weisbrod's proposal that option value and other
preservation values represent important social benefits, and should be
added to the aggregate consumer surplus of recreation activities to deter-
mine the total benefit of environmental amenities to society. In the
absence of such an estimate, insufficient resources would be allocated by
society to preservation of unique environments such as pristine mountain
streams where mineral and energy development may irreversibly degrade
water quality.
INTRODUCTION
The environmental economics literature identifies several possibilities
of willingness to pay for preservation of public non-market aspects of
environmental quality which are distinct from the direct or immediate
consumer surplus benefit from use of the natural environment. These
preservation benefits include option, bequest, and existence demands as
outlined by Krutilla [1967]. Option value is defined as the willingness
to pay for the opportunity to choose from among competing alternative uses
of a natural environment in the future. Existence value is the willing-
ness to pay for the knowledge that a natural environment is preserved.
Bequest value is defined as the willingness to pay for the satisfaction
derived from endowing future generations with a natural environment. Un-
fortunately, no empirical evidence bearing on the monetary significance
of such benefits has been forthcoming to assist in the development of
environmental policy. This paper provides what we believe to be the
first measurement of option value, arising in this case from the assured
choice of recreational use of preserved water quality in the presence of
potential irreversible water quality degradation due to mining activity
in the South Platte River Basin, Colorado.
Weisbrod [1964] originated the concept of option value. He wrote
in rebuttal to Friedman's [1962] advocacy of a policy of cutting down the
ancient redwoods in Sequoia National Park in the event that the present
value of the stream of annual net benefits accruing to park visitors was
found to fall below the current commercial value of redwood lumber.
According to Weisbrod, option value was the amount of money economic
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men who anticipate visiting the park, but are uncertain and in fact may
or may not make such a visit, would be willing to pay for an option which
would guarantee their future access. If this value could be estimated,
its magnitude would influence the public choice of whether or not the
park should be preserved. An uncertain supply and demand situatton
coupled with prohibitively high costs of renewing production, once stopped,
were identified as necessary conditions for the existence of option value.
Weisbrod's article generated a lengthy theoretical debate. Long
[1969] argued that option value was equivalent to expected consumer sur-
plus. Lindsay [1969] pointed out that Long had neglected Weisbrod's
assumption of uncertainty of purchase. Using a game theoretic framework,
Byerlee [1971] concluded that in the face of uncertain future demand, op-
tion value could be greater than, equal to, or less than consumer surplus.
Cicchetti and Freeman [1971] responded by showing that when uncertainty
in supply is also considered, a risk-averse individual would he willing
to pay to preserve his future option of use. Schmalensee [1972] argued
that an alternative risk is also borne if a natural environment is pre-
served -- that of a very small future demand. Since the sign and magnitude
of associated risk premiums are not generally known, he concluded that
consumer surplus should serve as the appropriate proxy for option value.
Two later articles [Arrow and Fisher, 1974; Henry, 1974] showed that
option value is distinct from consumer surplus and may attain significance
even for a risk-neutral individual. Arrow and Fisher examined the question
of whether or not the existence of option value for a risk-neutral indivi-
dual necessarily led to a similar situation for society. They formulated
a "quasi-option" value model in terms of the aggregate benefits and costs
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that would be incurred by choosing various alternative environmental uses.
It was concluded that even in the aggregate, society should take cognizance
of the presence of option value. The Henry model was based on individual
willingness to pay for the assurance of selecting the preservation of an
irreplaceable environmental asset facing an imminent irreversible commit-
ment, until such time that sufficient information becomes available affect-
ing the future option decision of selecting from among alternative uses.
We adopted the Henry model for our study. The specific objective
of the study was to empirically test the application of the Henry framework
in the measurement of benefits of water quality improvement. The benefits
measured include:
(1) Consumer surplus from enhanced enjoyment of water-based recrea-
tion activities;
(2) Option value of assured choice of recreation use in the future
by avoidance of irrevocable pollution by mineral and energy
development; and
(3) Existence and bequest values for non-users.
Empirical estimates were derived using a simulated market bidding game.
THEORETICAL MODEL
After Henry, consider a two time-period model defined in accordance
with the following symbols:
N = The Nth individual
	
U	 N's utility function
Y = N's income
CS = N's consumer surplus generated from use of the natural environment
D = Availability of the irreplaceable natural environment
D = d, the natural environment which is available
D = d*, the natural environment has been appropriated for an




i = States of the world, i = 1, 2
j = Time period, j = 1, 2
P i = Probability that state i will occur (where EP., = 1 for i	 1, 2)
Cj = Opportunity cost to retain the natural environment
The model is predicated on the following assumptions: (1) the future
is uncertain, (2) one use of the natural environment is more irreversible
than the other, (3) a decision is imminent as to which of the two compet-
ing uses of the natural environment will be chosen, and (4) sequential
decision making takes place based on improved information acquired through
time. Let
2	 2	 . .
(1) U =	 , DJ )
j =1 i=1 " 1
be N's two period probability-weighted utility function. Assume an oppor-
tunity cost 0 must be paid to obtain Di = d, that is, a cost is imposed
in the form of foregone alternatives if the natural environment is to
remain available. C I and C 2 must be financed at instant 1 and instant 2,
respectively, if Dj = d is chosen. For simplicity of exposition 0 and 0
are assumed known with certainty. The notation may then be simplified to
Ui(Y j , d*) = Ul(d*) and in later equations, Ui(Y j - CJ , d) = Uji(d).
Finally, assume that
2	 2
(2) PlUl(d)	 I PlUl(d*)
i=1 1 1	 i=1 1 1
This assumption specifies that if only the first period is considered, N
will choose d* so that the natural environment is not available. In this
case the cost, C I , of preserving the natural environment is greater than
the associated benefits in period 1.
In the following case no new information is expected to become avail-
able between instant 1 and instant 2. A decision is made as if a "timeless
world" existed. Consumer surplus for N can be defined as the equating
factor in
2	 2	 2	 2	 . .






N will be willing to pay an amount CS at instant 1 to have d. Even after
payment of CS, the individual will still receive the same expected utility
as if the natural environment were not available.
N will choose the preserved natural environment as opposed to the
development alternative if CS > Ci . .No CS term need Appear in the second
period term of the preservation alternative since no change in information
occurs between the two periods. As long as C I is paid at instant 1 the
natural environment will be available in all following periods because of
the static situation. In this case CS is the present worth to N of the
preserved natural environment for all time.
Now assume that new information enters between instant 1 and instant
2. Individual N will know with certainty at instant 2 which state of the
world will obtain. Assuming a sequential decision-making process takes
place the following question must be answered: How much will N be willing
to pay at instant 1 to (1) enjoy the natural environment through period 1
and (2) to have the option of choosing under conditions of certainty at
instant 2 whether or not to retain the natural environment?





(4)	 1 PlUl(Y 1 - CS/ -0V,d)+ I Pimax[U1(4), Ui(4*)]




= y	 1 PqU4(d*)
j=1 i=1
The terms CS / and OV balance equation (4). At instant 1 individual N
will be willing to pay CS / to enjoy the natural environment during period
1. In addition, N is willing to pay an amount OV to choose, at instant
2, either the preserved environment or the irreversible alternative with
full knowledge of which state of the world will obtain. In equation (4)
CS / results from the enjoyment of the preserved natural environment through
period 1 only. The magnitude of OV in period 1 is a function of Pi, Ui(d),
and Ui(d*) in period 2 as they exist at instant 1.










[PlUI(Y 1 - CS / - OV, d)] + P l U i (d) + P2 U 2 (d*)
22	 4 .
= I 1 rifig(d*)




P i U i( d ) + P2 1j2(d* ) > y P?U?(d*)
1 = 1 "
2	 2	 2
> U l (d*) and U 2 (d) < U2(d*)
2	 2
< U l (d*) and U2 (d) > U2(d*)
2	 2
< 1.1 1 (d*) and 4(d) < U2(d*)
2	 2






exists because maximum values of U(d) and 1.1 2.(d*) were chosen. Therefore,
DV > zero and d will be chosen at instant 1 if CS' + OV > C I . The magni-
tude of DV is determined precisely by the difference between the right and
left-hand expressions of inequality (6). In cases (b) and (c) OV will
likewise be positive. Only in case (d) will option value equal zero.
None of the four possible situations will produce a negative option value.
Option value is irrelevant to the decision-making process as long
as CSj > C3 . The option to use the environment in the future has been pre-
served free of cost. Option value is a free by-product as long as the
user benefit of the preserved environment exceeds the opportunity costs
of preservation. It is for this reason that inequality (2) is required.
This expression states that if the first period is considered by itself,
development is preferred over preservation. Under this condition it is
necessary to include explicit consideration of the second period in order
to determine the proper course of action at the beginning of period one.
Henry extended the original analysis to an infinite number of sequential
decision-making time periods. This empirical investigation, however, was
. limited to two time periods.
EMPIRICAL PROCEDURES
The contingent valuation approach was utilized in this study. The
U.S. Water Resources Council [1979] has approved use of the method for
valuation of recreation resources. Respondents answered "yes" or "no"
to dollar increments in willingness to pay, contingent on hypothetical
changes in water quality with the highest acceptable value presumed to
correspond to the point of indifference between income and the environ-
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mental amenity. Many economists share Freeman's [1979] reservations
about the approach, primarily because of the potential for strategic
behavior by respondents, which may bias the results in the direction of
a preferred policy. Utilizing market-related data has been preferred by
most analysts in the past, since such analyses are based on actual behav-
ior rather than responses to hypothetical situations.
It is notable that objections to the contingent valuation approach
have been primarily theoretical, as empirical evidence of systematic bias
is at best inconclusive. Davis, who pioneered the iterative bidding pro-
cedure in a study of the recreation benefits of the Maine woods, concluded
that the reported values were not significantly different from those ob-
tained by the market-related travel cost approach [Knetsch and Davis, 1966].
Randall and associates developed refinements in the contingent valuation
technique and presented a persuasive case for its effectiveness in the
valuation of environmental quality. They studied the benefits from improved
air quality and other environmental amenities in the Four Corners area of
New Mexico [Randall et al., 1974] and the Glen Canyon National Recreation
Area [Brookshire eta]., 1976]. They found no measurable strategic behavior
by environmentalists compared to other respondents. Replication of the
studies resulted in similar values. Bohm [1972] conducted a controlled
experiment comparing five alternative measures of willingness to pay for
a public good, including actual immediate payment in cash of the stated
willingness to pay. He found no significant difference in values reported
by five groups, each presented with an alternative willingness to pay for-
mat. Bohm [1979] concluded that the theoretical objections to the contingent
va l ua t ion approach could be resolved by application of an interval method.
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Two benefit functions would be derived, based on minimum and maximum in-
centives to misrepresent willingness to pay. The midpoint of the interval
would represent the most acceptable value.
The willingness to pay measure of the value of improved water quality
was selected over the alternative, willingness to sell or accept compensa-
tion for reduced quality. The appropriate question depends on the resource
decision to be made. Congress in P.L. 92-500 determined that polluting
rights are not for sale. Thus, the question of what level of compensation
would be required to allow recreationists to remain no worse off than before
pollution of recreation water resources is of only peripheral interest.
A number of studies including Bishop and Heberlein [1979] have found that
willingness to sell values including actual cash sales are considerably
higher than willingness to pay, whether the latter is measured by contin-
gent valuation or the travel cost approach. This would be the expected
result, as willingness to pay would be constrained by limited household
income and time budgets as well as other variables [Gordon and Knetsch,
1979].
A random sample of 202 resident households in Denver and Fort Collins,
Colorado, were interviewed in their homes during the summer, 1976. A com-
parison of sample and population demographic characters of Denver and Fort
Collins showed little sample bias. Racial minorities and young adults
between 18 and 24 years of age were slightly under-represented. At the
outset of the interview, respondents were shown color photos of three
stream sites (labeled A, B, and C) in the River Basin and were provided
technical information about the degree of heavy metal pollution at the
sites. The color photos were selected to represent the range of water
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quality in the River Basin and to limit variations in composition so that
water quality would be the sole basis for differentiation. Technical in-
formation about heavy metal concentration served as an index of water
quality. The U.S. Geological Survey [Wentz, 1974; Moran and Wentz; 19741
found that Site C exceeded heavy metal concentration recommended for drink-
ing water; Site B exceeded heavy metal concentration recommended for fish
and wildlife survival; and no heavy metals were present at Site A. Ideally,
color photos should include a visual depiction of all water quality para-
meters which could influence perception of suitability for water-based
recreation. Color photos can realistically depict evidence of visual
pollution such as heavy metal mine drainage, algae, weeds, and sediment
but not odor nor the presence of harmful chemicals and bacteria which
can only be inferred from visual attributes. Color photos have the advan-
tage of allowing respondents to choose the specific characteristics of
water quality which relate to their recreation experience.
The two methods of payment employed lend realism and credibility to
the simulated market situations. The general sales tax and the residential
water-sewer fee represent established routinized methods of paying for
public services such as water quality improvement. Most respondents could
readily conceive that pollution abatement may be financed by either approach.
The sales tax measure was considered superior to the water-sewer fee in
reducing the effects of the free-rider problem. Tourism is the third
largest industry in the River Basin and sales taxes paid by tourists are
an important source of revenue to state and local units of government.
While payment of water-sewer fees are a monthly routine for property owners,
renters do not pay directly. Of course, water-sewer fees are paid indirectly
by renters and tourists alike in the purchase prices of goods and services.
Nonetheless, residential property owners are likely to conceive of a proper
range for water-sewer charges and recent experience with escalating fees
may have resulted in understatement of their willingness to pay for water
quality. To avoid these possible biases, Davis [1963] recommended the
general cost of recreation activities as a hypothetical payment method.
However, this was not deemed a suitable approach for measuring non-use
preservation values.
We hypothesized that the starting point at which the bidding began
would not produce any significant bias. If the starting dollar amount
resulted in a negative response, it simply would be lowered until an
acceptable level was reached. The starting point was 50 cents per month
for the water-sewer fee with incremental changes of 50 cents per month.
The sales tax iteration began at one-half cent per dollar of expenditure
with incremental changes of one-fourth cent. Respondents were shown an
Internal Revenue Service tax rate schedule with the estimated annual
sales tax paid by household size and income categories. The starting points
generated revenue of $6 per year in water-sewer fees and $25 per year in
sales tax for a typical household of four with an average income of $13,500
per year.
Respondents were informed that the payment reported would be used
for water quality improvements to enhance recreational enjoyment. The
definition of recreational enjoyment was left to each individual. Any
definition of water-based activities provided might have omitted an
activity for which the respondent would be willing to pay. As a result,
respondents conceived of water-based recreation broadly to include
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swimming, boating, fishing, sightseeing, picnicking, camping, hiking,
driving, and other leisure time activities within view of lakes and
streams.
It was specified that all waterways in the River Basin would be
improved to level A by 1983 and preserved at that level indefinitely.
The Federal Water Pollution Act Amendments of 1972 designated recreation
as one of the principle benefits of the water quality program and set
a national goal of providing water suitable for contact recreation by
1983. This deadline has since been extended.
The hypothetical situation posited was designed to be as realistic
as possible. Irreversible water quality conditions exist in several
areas of the state, as a result of past mining practices and the prohibi-
tive cost of rectifying the damage. I/ The imminent possibility of ex-
panding mining development and the incumbent high probability of
irreversible water quality impairment in the River Basin provided an
appropriate setting for investigating the empirical significance of
option value. Bishop [1977] noted that a similar potential exists in the
adjacent Colorado River Basin.
An introductory scenario explained the potential mining development
and the probable consequences to water quality. The two alternative uses
of the waterways were set forth and substitution possiblities were mini-
mized. The option value questions took the following form:
In the near future, one of two alternatives is likely to occur
in the South Platte River Basin. The first alternative is that
a large expansion in mining development will soon take place,
creating jobs and income for the region. As a consequence, how-
ever, many lakes and streams would become severely polluted. It
is highly unlikely, as is shown in Situation C, that these water-
ways could ever be returned to their natural condition. They
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could not be used for recreation. Growing demand could cause all
other waterways in the area to be crowded with other recreation-
ists.
The second possible alternative is to postpone any decision to
expand mining activities which would irreversibly pollute these
waterways. During this time, they would be preserved at level A
for your recreational use. Furthermore, information would become
available enabling you to make a decision with near certainty
in the future, as to whether it is more beneficial to you to
preserve the waterways at level A for your recreational use or
to permit mining development. Of course, if the first alterna-
tive takes place, you could not make this future choice since
the waterways would be irreversibly polluted.
Given your chances of future recreational use, would you be
willing to pay an additional 	 cents on the dollar in
present sales taxes every year to postpone mining development?
This postponement would permit information to become available
enabling you to make a decision with near certainty in the
future as to which option (recreational use or mining develop-
ment) would be most beneficial to you.1! Would it be reasonable
to add 	  to your water bill every month for this postpone-
ment?
Similar although much abbreviated questions were asked separately with
respect to benefits from enhanced enjoyment of current water-based recrea-
tion use and non-use preservation values including the existence and bequest
of clean water resources in the River Basin [Walsh et al., 1978].
RESULTS
Table I summarizes the responses to the survey. The sales tax values
will be emphasized for ease of exposition, followed by a comparison with
water-sewer fee estimates. Willingness to pay additional sales taxes for
the option to choose to engage in water-based recreation activities in the
future was estimated as $23 annually per household. This is the mean
population-weighted value for the 80 percent of sample households who ex-
pect to continue to use waterways in the River Basin for recreation
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activities in the future. Of the 202 households surveyed, about 20 per-
cent were unwilling to pay because they did not expect to engage in water-
based recreation activities in the future. About 60 percent were willing
to pay some positive amount of sales tax for option value. Thus, the mean
option value of $23 includes 20 percent who reported zero values. Those
reporting zero values felt that water quality preservation was unnecessary,
as their households were not believed to be harmed by water pollution.
Others rejected the bidding game itself. Some considered it unfair to ex-
pect those adversely affected by water pollution to pay the costs of
improvement. Others said taxes were already too high and expressed little
confidence in the ability of responsible government entities to implement
an effective program of water quality preservation. Some were dissatis-
fied with the hypothesized mechanism of payment for water quality.
Water quality improvement shifts the demand curve for water-based
recreation activities. The economic benefit generated is consumer surplus
delineated as the area between demand curves with and without water pollu-
tion [Freeman, 1979]. The 80 percent of households interviewed who engage
in water-based recreation activities in the River Basin re ported they were
willing to pay an average of $57 for water quality to enhance the enjoy-
ment of these activities. This figure is quite similar to Oster's [1977]
estimate of the annual recreation benefits from improved water quality in
the Merrimack River Basin as $12 per resident or $48 for a family of four
in 1973. Adjusted for inflation to 1976, that estimate is well within the
95 percent confidence interval of our estimate for the South Platte River
Basin.
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The economic significance of option value and the other preservation
values is that they shift the vertical intercept of the demand curve for
water quality preservation. The inclusion of option value shifted the
demand curve for water quality preservation in the River Basin by an
average of $23 per year, equal to a 40 percent increase in the current
recreation use value of water quality. Summing the two values, the total
recreation-derived benefit of improved water quality to the 80 percent of
the households who expect to continue to use waterways in the River Basin
for recreation activities averaged $79 annually. To put this in perspec-
tive, it was equivalent to approximately $5 per household recreation
activity day in 1976.
Additional preservation benefits to the general population residing
in the River Basin (existence and bequest value) were defined to include
the satisfaction derived from knowledge of the existence of a natural
waterway ecosystem and its bequest to future generations. About 20 per-
cent of the households interviewed who do not use the River Basin for
recreation activities reported they were willing to pay an average of $25
annually for knowledge of the existence of the natural aquatic ecosystem
and $17 annually to bequest clean water to future generations, for a total
non-user value of $42 annually. Estimates of these values also were ob-
tained from recreation users, premised on the hypothetical assumption of
certain knowledge they would not engage in water-based recreation activities
in the River Basin. Not surprisingly, responses of present users were
larger than for non-users. Average existence value of recreation users
was $34 and bequest value $33, for a total non-use value of $67 annually,
or 60 percent more. Existence and bequest value estimates reported by
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recreation users are the values which would remain in the absence of rec-
reation use. We believe these preservation values should not be added to
recreation use and option values because of the high probability of upward
bias. As a first approximation, the existence and bequest value estimates
for non-user households were extrapolated to all residents of the River
Basin, including recreation users.
Table II shows our estimates of total annual recreation and aesthetic
benefits of water quality aggregated over the 576,435 households residing
in the River Basin. Based on willingness to pay an additional sales tax,
total annual benefits were estimated as $61 million, including option
value of $10.5 million, recreation use value of $26.4 million, existence
Value of $14.4 million, and bequest value of $9.8 million.
Assuming a 6 3/8 percent discount rate and an infinite time horizon,
the present value of annual benefits from water quality improvement in
the River Basin was calculated as nearly $1 billion. This estimate in-
cludes option value of $165 million, recreation use value of $414 million,
existence value of about $226 million and bequest value of $153 million.
These present value estimates are premised on the assumption of
constant annual benefits. This may he a reasonable forecast of recreation
and aesthetic benefits for the foreseeable future in an economy beset with
energy shortages, high prices, and near stable incomes. However, outdoor
recreation has grown at an average annual rate of 5 percent per year during
the previous decade. If the historic 5 percent annual growth rate continued
to the year 2000, the present value of water quality in the River Basin
would increase by about 15 percent to $1.1 billion.
17
Tables I and II show that willingness to pay for water quality was
quite sensitive to the method of hypothetical payment. Residents sampled
reported willingness to pay only about one-fourth as much in water-sewer
fees as in sales tax for the option value of water quality. Respondents
were more reluctant to participate in the water-sewer bill estimation pro-
cedure, and may have perceived inequities. Everyone, including tourists,
pays sales taxes whereas only property owners and indirectly renters, pay
water-sewer bills. Moreover, recent experience with escalating water-
sewer fees may have resulted in understatement of willingness to pay for
water quality.
CONCLUSION
The purpose of this study was to develop and apply a procedure for
measuring option value and other preservation values of water quality,
compared to benefits from water-based recreation activities. The results
of the study provide an empirical test of Weisbrod's [1964] proposal that
option value and other preservation values should be added to the aggregate
consumer surplus of recreation activities to determine the total benefit
of environmental amenities to society. In the absence of such an estimate,
insufficient resources would be allocated by society to preservation of
unique environments such as pristine mountain streams in the South Platte
River Basin. The Henry [1974] model of option value was successfully test-
ed in which respondents reported willingness to pay for the option to
choose between two environmental alternatives, either clean water or
polluted water from mining development, at some future time under conditions






*Research conducted with funds provided under EPA Grant R 803206-01-5
and by the Colorado State University Experiment Station. The authors
acknowledge the helpful suggestions of Anthony Fisher, John Krutilla,
John McKean, Anthony Prato, and Alan Randall.
1. Historically, gold, silver, lead, and zinc mines have been major
sources of water pollution, including sediment, acidity, and heavy metals.
Irreversible drainage of pollutants flow from both abandoned and active
mine shafts, mill sites, slag piles, and tailing ponds. Uranium, molybde-
num, and other metals are extensively mined in the River Basin. Recently,
gold and silver mining have also expanded in response to higher prices.
The River Basin also contains two large coal fields. Increased diversion
for irrigation, industrial, and domestic consumption concentrates effluent
load.
2. This scenario does not identify the specific time interval necessary
for the attainment of full knowledge of the economic impact of the optional
environmental choices available if the second alternative is selected. The
interval required for the collection and dissemination of the appropriate
information was uncertain. The question explicitly specifies that the op-
tion benefit assessment would continue for an indefinite period until the
required information was available. This approach is consistent with the
theoretical model which requires that the first period in state 2 be of
sufficient leHyth to allow for collection of the necessary information.
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TABLE I
Resident Household Willingness to Pay Additional Sales Tax and Water Service
Assessments for Water Quality Preservation in the South Platte River Basin,
Colorado (mean values in 1976 dollars)
Water Annual D liars
Fee/ Tax
Water Quality Month Rate Water Sales,
Preservation Values (dollars) Scents) Fee Tax-4(
Denver Metropolitan Area
Option Value 0.50 0.39 6.00 18.31
95% Confidence Interval (4.58-7.51) (13.27-23.36)
Percent of Total Value 17.7% 15.5% 17.7% 16.5%
Number Reporting 83 88
Bequest Value' 0.46 0.42 5.52 16.43
95% Confidence Interval (3.93-7.22) (6.67-26.19)
















Percent of Total Value 19.1% 27.9% 19.1% 23.5%
Number Reporting 14 15
Recreation Value-
d/
1.32 1.00 15.84 50.18
95% Confidence Interval (12.99-18.69) (42.94-57.43)
Percent of Total Value 46.8% 39.8% 46.8% 45.2%
Number Reporting 85 85
Total Preservation and
Recreation Value 2.82 2.51 33.84 110.95
Fort Collins
Option Value 1.00 0.85 12.00 22.60
95% Confidence Interval (5.68-18.14) (20.11-47.99)
Percent of Total Value 24.0% 25.1% 24.0% 22.9%
Number Reporting 78 89
Bequest Value' 0.42 0.40 5.04 18.42
95% Confidence Interval (2.70-7.31) (-9.70-46.53)
Percent of Total Value 10.1% 11.8% 10.1% 12.4%
Number Reporting 9 9
Existence Valueg 0.58 0.50 6.96 22.17
95% Confidence Interval (5.37-8.63) (5.33-49.66)
Percent of Total Value 13.9% 14.8% 13.9% 14.9%
Number Reporting






Water Quality Month Rate Water Sales






95% Confidence Interval (11.79-40.06)	 (51.07-96.94)
Percent of Total Value 51.9% 48.2%	 51.9%	 49.8%
Number Reporting 89 89
Total Preservation and
Recreation Value 4.16	 3.38	 49.92	 148.64
South Platte River Basin !"
Option Value	 0.64	 0.527.68	 22.60
Percent of Total	 Value	 20.1%	 19.0%	 20.1%	 18.6%
Number Reportingc,	 161	 177
Grouped T-Value II	 1.01	 1.51
Bequest Value-
b/
	0.45	 0.41	 5.40	 16.97
Percent of Total	 Value	 14.1%	 15.0%	 14.1%	 14.0%
Number Reportingc,	 23	 24




-	 0.55	 0.64	 6.60	 24.98
Percent of Total	 Value	 17.2%	 23.3%	 17.2%	 20.6%
Number Reportingc ,	 23	 24
Grouped T-Value -11	 0.99	 1.69
d/
Recreation Value-	 1.55	 1.17	 18.60	 56.68
Percent of Total Value	 48.6%	 42.7%	 48.6%	 46.8%
Number Reporting c ,	 174	 174
Grouped 1-Value 21	 0.81	 1.32
Total Preservation and
Recreation Value	 3.19	 2.74	 38.25	 121.23
a. From U.S. Internal Revenue Service [1974].
b. Willingness to pay estimate for a sub-sample of non-recreationists for
the benefit derived from the assurance that future generations will have
access to a preserved natural environment in the South Platte River Basin,
Colorado.
c. Willingness to pay estimate for a sub-sample of non-recreationists for
the benefit derived from the knowledge that a preserved natural reserve
exists as a habitat for various species of potentially unique flora and
fauna.
d. Defined as any water-associated recreation benefit derived from preserva-
tion of a high level of water quality by 1983.
,w,	
(continued on following page)
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Table I - Notes (continued)
e. Weighted by population. The Denver Metropolitan Area population of
1,267,000 persons excluding Boulder County was 72.7 percent of the
1,742,900 persons in the South Platte River Basin in 1976.
f. Tests the significance of difference between grouped mean values.
At the 5 percent level, there is no statistically significant difference
between the Denver and Fort Collins mean option value estimates.
TABLE II






















Water Fee 2,042,682 32,042,078 193,236 3,031,153 3,581,687 56,183,321
Sales Tax 6,161,700 96,654,102 548,307 8,600,896 10,526,153 165,116,132
Bequest Value
Water Fee 2,366,693 37,124,596 94,615 1,484,157 3,118,513 48,917,856
Sales Tax 6,981,107 109,507,561 348,562 5,467,634 9,782,102 153,444,736
Existence Value
Water Fee 2,732,107 54,920,408 132,461 4,125,956 3,792,942 59,497,134
Sales Tax 11,060,147 173,492,502 419,523 6,580,752 14,399,346 225,872,099
Recreation Value
Water Fee 5,330,492 83,615,571 417,390 6,547,290 8,658,460 135,818,977
Sales Tax 16,886,624 264,888,216 1,191,622 18,692,110 26,399,220 414,105,414
Total Recreation and
Preservation Value
Water Fee 12,471,974 207,702,653 837,702 15,188,556 19,151,602 300,417,288
Sales Tax 41,089,578 644,542,381 2,508,014 39,341,392 61,106,821 958,538,381
a. Discounted at 6.3/8 percent. This was the discount rate recommended for water resource development




Arrow, K. J. and A. C. Fisher, "Environmental Preservation, Uncertainty,
and Irreversibility," Quarterly Journal of Economics, LXXXVIII
(May 1974), 312-19.
Bishop, A. Bruce, "Impact of Energy Development on Colorado River Water
Quality," Natural Resources Journal, XVII (Oct. 1977), 649-71.
Bishop, Richard C., and Thomas A. Heberlein, "Measuring Values of Extra-
market Goods: Are Indirect Measures Biased?" American Journal of 
Agricultural Economics, LXI (Dec. 1979), 926-30.
Bohm, Peter, "Estimating the Demand for Public Goods: An Experiment,"
European Economic Review, III (June 1972), 111-30.
	 , "Estimating Access Values," in Lowdon Wingo and Alan Evans,
eds., Public Economics and the Quality of Life (Baltimore: The
Johns Hopkins University Press for Resources for the Future and
the Centre for Environmental Studies, 1977).
	 , "Estimating Willingness to Pay: Why and How?" The Scandinavian 
Journal of Economics LXXXI (1979), 142-53.
Brookshire, David S., Berry C. Ives, and William D. Schultze, "The Valua-
tion of Aesthetic Preferences," Journal of Environmental Economics 
and Management, III (Fall 1976), 325-46.
Byerlee, D. R., "Option Demand and Consumer Surplus: Comment," Quarterly 
Journal of Economics, LXXXV (Aug. 1971), 523-27,
Cicchetti, C. J. and A. M. Freeman III, "Option Demand and Consumer Surplus:
Further Comment," Quarterly Journal of Economics, LXXXV (Aug. 1971),
529-39.
Conrad, Jon M., "Quasi-Option Value and the Expected Value of Information,"
Quarterly Journal of Economics, XCIV (1980), 813-20.
Davis, Robert K., "Recreation Planning as an Economic Problem," Natural 
Resources Journal, III (Oct. 1963), 239-49.
Freeman, A. Myrick III, The Benefits of Environmental Improvement: Theory 
and Practice (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press for
Resources for the Future, 1979).
Friedman, Milton, Capitalism and Freedom (Chicago: University of Chicago
Press, 1962).
Gordon, Irene M., and Jack Knetsch, "Consumer's Surplus Measures and the
Evaluation of Resources," Land Economics, LV (Feb. 1979), 1-10.
25
Greenley, Douglas A., "Recreation and Preservation Benefits from Water
Quality Improvement," Ph.D. Thesis, Colorado State University,
Fort Collins; 1979.
Henry, Claude, "Option Values in the Economics of Irreplaceable Assets,"
The Review of Economic Studies: Srposium on the Economics of
EWiustible Resources (19771)789-104.
Knetsch, J. L., and R. K. Davis, "Comparison of Methods for Recreation
Evaluation," in Allen V. Kneese and Stephen C. Smith, eds., Water 
Research (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press for Resources
for the Future, 1966).
Krutilla, John V., "Conservation Reconsidered," American Economic Review,
LVII (Sept. 1967), 777-86.
Lindsay, C. M., "Option Demand and Consumer's Surplus," Quarterly Journal 
of Economics, LXXXIII (May 1969), 344-45.
Lung, M. F., "Collective Consumption Services of Individual Goods: Connent,"
Quarterly Journal of Economics, LXXXI (May 1967), 351-52.
Moran R. E., and D. A. Wentz, Effects of Metal-Mine Drainage on Water 
Qualiti_in Selected Areas of Colorado, 1972-7a, Colorado Water Resources
Circular No. 25, Colorado Water Conservation Bo.rd, Denver, 1974.
Oster, Sharon, "Survey Results on the Benefits of Water Pollution Abatement
in the Merrimack River Basin," Water Resources Research, XIII (Dec.
1977), 882-84.
Randall, Alan, Barry Ives, and Clyde Eastman, "Bidding Games for Valuation
of Aesthetic Environmental Improvement," journal of  Environmental 
Economics  and Management, I (1974), 132-07-
Schmalensee, R., "Option Demand and Consumer's Surplus: Valuing Price
Changes Under Uncertainty," American  Economic Review, LXII (Dec.
1972), 814-24.
U.S. Internal Revenue Service, 1975 U.S. Individual Income  Tax Returns,
1975 Optional State Sales Tax Tables, Washington, D.C., 1174, 185.
U. S. Water Resources Council, Procedures for Evaluation of  National Economic
DevelL4mient (NEI) Benefits and Costs in Water Resource Planning,
Egg-al Register, liJashington, D.C., Dec. 14, lirrg.
Walsh, R. G., U. A. Greenley, R. A. Young, e_t dl., ption Values, Preserve-
tion_Values and Recreational . Benefits_of Improved Water  Quality: A 
Case Study of the South Platte River Basin, Colorado, U.S. Environment-
al Protection Agency, Socioeconomic Environmental Studies Series,
EPA-600/5-78-001, Research Triangle Park, Jan. 1978.
26
Weisbrod, B. A., "Collective-Consumption Services of Individualized-
Consumption Goods," Quarterly Journal of Economics, LXXVIII (Aug.
1964), 471-77.
Wentz, D. A., Effect of Mine Drainage on the Quality of Streams in Colorado 
1971-72, Colorado Water Resources Circular No. 21, Colorado Water
Conservation Board, Denver, 1974.
